Ukraine. Precarious Post-electoral Reversals by Flikke, Geir
1Policy Brief          1 · 2011       
Ukraine  
Precarious Post-electoral Reversals
Geir Flikke
Summary
Since Ukraine’s 2010 presidential elections, the governing 
coalition has annulled the 2004 constitutional amend-
ment enacted after the Orange Revolution. President Vic-
tor Yanukovich took up the question in June 2010, and on 
September 30, 2010, the Constitutional Court repealed 
the 2004 amendment. Ukraine has now returned de fac-
to to the 1996 Constitution. This policy brief outlines the 
political changes in Ukraine in 2010. It argues that these 
changes were partially a product of the transition of pow-
er between presidents Yushchenko and Yanukovich, and 
partially born out of the multiple deadlocks between pres-
ident and parliament from 2007 to 2009. Presidential pow-
ers have been reinforced, however, and the changes to the 
regional electoral law have served to construct a political 
arena that makes it difficult for the political forces of the 
opposition to compete against the majority coalition. 
Ukraine’s Shades of Democracy
As of 2010, Ukraine may be seen as something be-
tween an electoral democracy and an electoral authori-
tarian system. This is a shift from the earlier course. 
After the constitutional amendment of 2004, many 
predicted that Ukraine follow the trajectory of an elec-
toral democracy, which rests on the following criteria: 
a) that rules are recognizable and that they structure 
political behavior and political choice; b) that there is 
continuity in institutional arrangements and electoral 
arrangements; c) that regular elections are held in ac-
cordance with a fixed electoral scheme. The result of 
the 2010 presidential elections has had a fundamental 
impact on the institutional designs that preceded the 
elections, however. Institutional arrangements have 
been changed, and the former members of the Orange 
coalition have tried, in vain, to act within the frame-
work of the political reforms from 2004, to halt mo-
tions based on the simple majority of the new Azarov 
government coalition, and to appeal for popular sup-
port. Captured by the postponed regional elections, 
however, the appeal for popular support from the part 
of the opposition has fallen to the ground. Ukraine may 
now be closer to what Andreas Schedler1 has identified 
as ‘electoral authoritarianism’– an art of manipulation 
directed towards altering the arena of competition. 
The test case is always the space allowed for the op-
position, and the distinct set of manipulative practices 
that run across weakly institutionalized policy fields 
in between elections. Unlike purely authoritarian re-
gimes, electoral authoritarianism is about ‘access to 
power’ through popular elections. Electoral authori-
tarian regimes allow for ‘authoritarian manipulation, 
in which ruling parties seek to control the substantive 
outcomes of electoral competition, and the game of in-
stitutional reform’ (2006, p.12). Elements of this have 
been visible in 2010.
Pre- and Post Electoral Ukraine 2010
In his seminal work, Paul D’Anieri2 lists four ma-
jor causes of electoral authoritarianism in Ukraine: 
societal fragmentation, institutional design, power 
politics, and the non-revolutionary path of change. 
To a certain extent, institutional designs reflect the 
dynamics of other causes, such as social fragmenta-
tion, where D’Anieri sees the divisions of Ukrainian 
society as a major obstacle for an effective democracy, 
and hence also a driver for empowering the presi-
dency. Often illiberal democratic erosion is a result, 
as under Kutchma from 1999 and towards 2002. This 
policy brief focuses on the institutional design (strong 
presidency, electoral law and rules of parliament). I ar-
1 Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynam-
ics of Unfree Competition, Lynne Rienner Publishers: London 
and New York, 2006. 
2 Paul D’Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, 
and Institutional Design, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 2007. 
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gue that the way towards amending the 2004 consti-
tutional amendment has involved three factors. First, 
the ruling coalition amended the Rada regulations, 
second the electoral law (local elections) and third, the 
Constitution. Together, these changes have introduced 
a new dynamics in Ukrainian politics, and indeed one 
fraught with the heritage of stronger presidential rule. 
Moreover, the manner in which these reforms have 
been nested together indicates that the political play-
ing field for the opposition forces has been narrowed 
substantially. The process has involved installing a new 
majority government, revamping the Constitutional 
Court, and finally the coalesced process of amending 
the Constitution and the regional electoral law. 
Majority Government
Forming a government has been a persistent problem 
in Ukraine since 2005. Acknowledging the victory of 
Victor Yanukovich in the presidential 2010 elections, 
out going president Victor Yushchenko signed a new 
law allowing for the formation of a majority in the 
par liament.3 Yushchenko argued that the law should 
‘help the parliamentary forces leave the political cul-
de-sac of forming a majority in parliament’.  The inter-
pretation of this amendment was essential in dis mis-
sing the Tymoshenko government and in enabling the 
for mation of the Azarov government. On February 24, 
2010, the Party of Regions proposed a project for the 
for mation of a new parliamentary majority to the Rada 
chair man, Vladimir Litvin.4 The Party of Regions had 
also drafted a legal proposal on a vote of no confidence 
against the government. On March 3, the Rada chair-
man announced that he had not received a list of the 
re qui site 226 deputies supporting the government coa-
lition, and hence that the coalition formally did not exist. 
That same day, a vote of no confidence launched by the 
Party of Regions received 243 votes in the Rada, thereby 
effectively dismissing the Tymoshenko govern ment.5
The February 16th amendment was part and parcel of 
a transition of power from one president-elect to the 
other. Still, it re-opened the discussion on the consti-
tu tional foundation of power in Ukraine. This was 
taken a substantial step further on March 4, when the 
Party of Regions launched a draft law to change the 
Rada regulation’s article 61 to allow also independents 
to be released from their electoral mandate. The mo-
tion was supported by 228 votes in the first reading, 
three short of the list of signatures that was circulated 
simul taneously in support of a new government.6 At 
the same time, members of the coalition talked about 
the formation of a government before March 10. On 
March 9, the Rada chairman ruled against the opposi-
tion to conduct a speedy vote on amending the Rada 
regulation, ignoring the opposition’s call that this ran 
contrary to paragraph 6 of the Constitution.7 Finally, 
using majority representation in the Committee on 
parliamentary ethics, the Party of Regions and sup-
port parties could easily control mediating efforts in 
the Council of Faction leaders.8 The opposition consid-
ered these mediating efforts absurd, as the Council of 
Faction leaders was indeed mandated by the factions 
the majority wanted to declare invalid. Faction lead-
ers could not possibly have any say if the Rada vot-
ed to abolish factional coherence under the guise of 
for m ing a government coalition. Protests were not 
taken into account. Installed on March 12, 2010, not by 
vote, but by a list of signatures, the government had a 
backing of 235 deputies. The principle of majority was 
based on the fact that factional coherence was abol-
ished. In the upshot, the opposition was worried about 
stronger presidential rule, and that the new president 
was acting against the Constitution.9
Reinforced Presidential Rule
The new regulation on forming a majority government 
was paralleled by moves to strengthen the presidency. 
On February 28, Yanukovich signed a decree abolish-
ing the presidential secretariat of Yushchenko, and in-
stalling a leaner administration led by a peoples’ dep-
uty from the Party of Regions, Sergey Levochkin, who 
was also former vice-chairman of the Rada faction of 
the Party of Regions.10 The president himself took the 
lead in asking factions to form a majority in the Rada 
immediately after the vote of no confidence against 
the Tymoshenko government. The Ukrainian daily 
Kommersant remarked that this was actually against 
the Constitution, since the head of state should be 
controlled by the Rada, and not participate directly in 
bringing deputies over to his side.11 Moreover, it stood 
in sharp contrast to the Yushchenko period, where the 
president had acted as broker in parliamentary stand-
offs, as during the government crisis in 2006 when 
he launched the Universal Pact, and not as party to the 
formation of a majority coalition in the Rada. 
Replacements were also made in the Constitutional 
Court. On March 5, Yanukovich by decree dispatched 
a former Party of Regions peoples’ deputy to the po-
sition as deputy head of the presidential administra-
tion and the president’s representative.12 New policies 
were launched. To no avail, the opposition criticized 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling in April on lifting 
3 ‘Viktor Yushchenko poprosil prochshanie’, Kommersant, 17 Feb-
ruary 2010.
4 ‘Akt sozdaniya’, Kommersant, 25 February 2010.
5 ‘Kabinet zakryt’, Kommersant, 4 March 2010.
6 ‘Deputaty podobrali vyrazheniya’, Kommersant, 5 March 2010.
7 ‘Rada kazhdomu’, Kommersant, 10 March 2010. 
8 ‘Oppozitsya nastaivaet na uvolnenii glavy reglamentogo komiteta 
Rady’, Kommersant, 22 April 2010. 
 9 ‘Koalitsiya gotovit svoe predstavlenie’, Kommersant, 11 March 
2010.
10 ‘Prezident formiruet adminresurs’, Kommersant, 28 February 
2010.
11 ‘Esli budet 226 podpisey, ya ob’’yavlyu o nalichii koalitsii’, Kom-
mersant, 4 March 2010. See also: ‘Viktor Yanukovich zapustil 
protsess’, Kommersant, 4 March 2010.  
12 ‘Viktor Yanukovich obzovelsya novymi kadrami’, Kommersant, 5 
March 2010. 
3the immunity of the peoples’ deputies but keeping the 
immunity of the president. Representatives called it 
a ‘political ruling’, noting that Yanukovich had been 
one of the authors of the draft law of 2009 proposing 
to lift presidential immunity. As the balance of power 
had shifted, this was no longer needed. Again, this 
rule strengthened the presidency substantially, and re-
duced the Rada’s role in the power balance.13 All taken 
together, the solid Rada majority, the lifting of faction-
al discipline and the abolishment of immunity created 
a predicament for joining the pro-presidential team.
Amending the Constitution 
Yanukovich set the constitutional debate in motion 
again at two levels. In March he called in the diplomats 
of the G-8 and the EU countries to hear their views 
on the constitutionality of the formation of the Azarov 
government.14 The president assured at the meeting 
that he would ask the Constitutional Court to check the 
legality of changing the rules for government forma-
tion, but did not reflect on how the government had 
been formed. This unusual ‘hearing’ indicated that the 
head of state at least seemed mindful of sounding out 
the opinions of the international community on do-
mestic policies in Ukraine. On the other hand, if con-
stitutional rule had already been set aside, such a cour-
tesy call to the judiciary would have little significance. 
Indeed, the Constitutional Court ruled on the issue in 
the beginning of April, handing down a ruling in direct 
contradiction with an earlier ruling in 2008. The court 
said that the formation of the government coalition did 
not run contrary to the Constitution, while the ruling 
from 2008 explicitly stated that only factions could 
take part in a government coalition.15 
In June 2010, Yanukovich openly spoke of the need to 
reverse the 2004 amendment, arguing that governance 
was not effective under it. The Rada treated the issue in 
July parallel to the adoption of a legislative act on the 
internal gas market of Ukraine. In all, 252 deputies – 
i.e. the majority coalition – held that the Constitutional 
Court should rule on the legality of the amendment of 
December 9, 2004, stating that it had been adopted af-
ter a ‘breach in procedures’. Again, Ukraine was split. 
Members of the Party of Regions were adamant that 
Ukraine should return to presidential rule, and to the 
Constitution of 1996, while the opposition argued that 
the amendment had, since being adopted, become part 
of the ‘body’ of the Constitution and a part of consti-
tutional governance. In the upshot, the Constitutional 
Court played an interfering role, with the former chair-
man of the Court, Sergey Strizhak, declaring to the 
media that the Constitution had no ‘body’, only letters. 
The issue was settled through the Rada chairman in 
a closed meeting with the heads of the Constitutional 
Court and government officials, all from the Party of 
Regions: no members of the opposition were present.16 
On September 30, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
the 2004 amendment was invalid. 
The Regional Elections
In an electoral democracy, elections are incentives 
for forces to pool resources. In Ukraine, however, 
the 2010 regional elections have been a victim of po-
litical games manship. Originally set for 2011, regional 
electi ons were postponed by a Rada vote on February 
16, 2010, pending a new law draft. This was launched 
in April 2010, and stipulated prolonging the man-
date of regio nal councils (including Crimea), and the 
chairmen of city councils, from four to five years. The 
change was to take effect from the regional elections to 
be held in 2011. However, the draft was interpreted as 
hav ing retroactive validity for the regional elections of 
2006. Representatives who had been elected for four 
years in 2006 would automatically receive an extra 
year in office if the bill were passed. This raised new is-
sues, and the ruling coalition postponed a decision on 
the elections by sending the bill to the Constitutio nal 
Court. The court reached a conclusion in June, argu-
ing that the terms of office for future elections should 
be prolonged, but not with retroactive effect. The Rada 
went further, adopting a new law on local elec tions that 
stipulated holding elections on October 31, 2010. 
More important than the date was the fact that the law 
nar rowed the field of competition. First, while favor-
ing the dominant parties from the 2006 and 2007 
elec tions, the law ruled out many new parties that 
had em erged from the presidential elections, among 
them Arsenii Yatsenyuk’s Front of Change, and Ser-
hiy Tyhyp ko’s Strong Ukraine. Second, the law broke 
with earlier practices, stating that all candidates for 
mayoral positions had to be registered with parties. 
This amendment undermined the positions of several 
independent local mayors, with further centralization 
and less regional power as a result. Third, only formal-
ly recognized parties could run, not blocs. This latter 
restriction threw a demolishing spanner in the works 
for the opposition’s largest party bloc, the Yuliya Ty-
moshenko Bloc. Finally, the delay in adopting the law 
reduced the time for registration and nomination of 
candi dates from 90 days to 50 days. The shortening of 
the pre-electoral period made it difficult for the NGO 
sector to estimate the consequences for the political 
arena, and to prepare exit polls.17 
13 ‘Viktor Yanukovich sokhranil immunitet’, Kommersant, 8 April, 
2010.
14 ‘Viktoru Yanukovich priznalis’ v legitimnost’’, Kommersant, 11 
March 2010.
15 ‘Deputatov ne rassudili’, Kommersant, 9 April 2010. The only 
ambassador to protest visibly against this was the Ambassador 
of the UK. 
16 ‘Narodnye deputaty vykhodyat na otmenu’, Kommersant, 15 July 
2010. Present at the meeting were Andrey Klyuyev, first deputy 
prime minister and earlier deputy head of the parliamentary 
fraction of the Party of Regions, and Adam Martyniuk, mem-
ber of the faction of Ukraine’s Communist Party. Martiniuk had 
been installed as deputy speaker of the Rada by partisan promo-
tion from the ranks of the Party of Regions when Aleksander 
Lavrinovich was appointed Minister of Justice. According to tra-
ditions, this post had been granted the opposition, but this was 
ignored. ‘Kommunisty vzyali ne svoe’, Kommersant, 12 May 2010.
17 Radio Ukraine, http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148& lis-
tid=131604, accessed on 5 November 2010.
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Snap changes and new rules have had an effect on 
the reporting of results. Illustratively, results have ap-
peared earlier in newspapers than on the website of 
the Central Electoral Commission itself. Indeed, the 
electoral commission has recently stated that it ‘may 
consider’ publishing results at a later date.18 To be 
sure, the regional elections were nested in a chain of 
political controversies and reforms. Still, the criterion 
of an electoral democracy – to hold regular and trans-
parent elections that also provide real incentives for 
the contenders – was not heeded. The electoral result 
itself produced no clear indication as to the political 
balance in Ukraine. The Party of Regions has won 
mayoral elections in 10 of a total of 24 oblast centers, 
with the sharpest contender, Batkivshchina (associ-
ated with the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc) winning in 
only two. In Kharkov, the electoral result was disputed, 
with the Party of Regions barely winning over the Bat-
kivshchina nominee. The rest of the total of 24 major 
centers was won by a hodgepodge of various parties 
not represented in the national legislature.19 
Conclusions
The precarious reversals in Ukraine that started in 
March 2010 and ended in October 2010 may produce 
new problems. First, the current government enjoys 
close relations the president, which may effectively 
strengthen presidential rule. Formally, this is in line 
with the 1996 Constitution, but Yanukovich was not 
elected according to this Constitution. The current 
electoral coalition is also prone to strengthen both 
presidential rule and a more intrusive administrative 
bureaucracy. Second, the opposition associated with 
reforms, anti-authoritarianism and national values has 
been weakened both by amendments of the Rada regu-
lations, and changes in the law on regional elections. 
This may further increase the divisiveness in Ukrain-
ian politics. To be sure, the divisiveness of Ukrainian 
politics in recent years has led to numerous institu-
tional deadlocks, and the institutional design from 
2004 was not clear. Indeed, the EU warned against it 
in 2004. This said, it was supported by 402 of 450 dep-
uties, and also of the bulk of what is now the Party of 
Regions. The fact that this amendment has now been 
rolled back testifies to more than a change of heart: It 
seems more a case of settling the scores. The earlier 
power-sharing model of 2004 was (ideally, at least) de-
signed to balance presidential powers against those of 
the government and the parliament. This power-shar-
ing model has now become a thing of the past. 
The government has been seeking legitimacy from 
the EU for these reversals. For the EU, however, this is 
less of a matter of technicalities, and more a question 
of values, as it has been in most EU statements on 
Ukraine. The latest summit between Ukraine and the 
EU reflected this, with strong conditionality from the 
EU that the incentives of visa-free travel and the EU 
open door policy will remain pending on a strict dem-
ocratic record of Ukraine towards the parliamentary 
elections in 2012.20 In this sense, the EU’s value card 
has been rejuvenated and combined with a clear state-
ment from the European Parliament that Ukraine is 
entitled to become a member only if it qualifies and 
does not reverse democratic gains. In the further con-
text, Brussels will hold the free-trade agreement car-
rot and the European Parliament the value stick. That 
might prove to be a good combination, also in the 
sense that the EU then remains true to its values. 
18 Kyiv Post, 8 November, 2010, at: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/
politics/detail/89186/#ixzz14gUgMd1g 
19 Kommersant, 8 November, 2010, at: http://www.kommersant.ua/
doc.html?docId=1534981, accessed on 8 November 2010. 20 Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 December 2010. 
